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An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an
asset market coexist is modelled.
Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct ¯nancial systems depend-
ing on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less
e±cient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the
evolving ¯nancial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks
only provide e±cient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment
alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary ¯nancial market nor do they pro-
vide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large
extent in the primary as well as in the secondary ¯nancial markets. In the other case
of a relatively high fraction of households with ine±cient direct investment oppor-
tunities, a bank-dominated ¯nancial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity
transformation, are active in secondary ¯nancial markets and are the only player in
primary markets, while households only participate in secondary ¯nancial markets.
Secondly, we analyze the e®ect a run on a single bank has on the entire ¯nancial
system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion
via the ¯nancial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated
¯nancial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) ¯nancial sys-
tems ¯re sales of long-term ¯nancial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop
in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.Zusammenfassung
Im vorliegenden Papier wird eine Ä Okonomie modelliert, in der Diamond/ Dybvig-
Banken neben einem Finanzmarkt koexistieren.
Innerhalb dieses Ansatzes lÄ asst sich zunÄ achst zeigen, dass zwei sehr unterschiedliche
Finanzsysteme entstehen, je nach dem wie hoch der Anteil von solchen Haushalten in
der Ä Okonomie ist, die im Vergleich zu Banken weniger e±ziente AnlagemÄ oglichkeiten
am Finanzmarkt haben. Ist der Anteil dieser Haushalte vergleichsweise gering, so
entsteht ein Finanzsystem, das sich als markt-orientiertes au®assen lÄ asst. In diesem
System beschrÄ ankt sich die Funktion von Banken darauf, auch den Haushalten mit
weniger rentablen DirektanlagemÄ oglichkeiten eine e±ziente Investitionsalternative zu
bieten. WÄ ahrend hier Banken nicht am sekundÄ aren Finanzmarkt partizipieren, han-
deln private Haushalte sowohl am PrimÄ ar- als auch am SekundÄ armarkt. Einlage-
vertrÄ age von Banken bieten in diesem Finanzsystem keine LiquiditÄ atsversicherung.
Ist hingegen der Anteil der Haushalte mit wenig e±zienten DirektanlagemÄ oglichkeiten
vergleichsweise hoch, so bildet sich eine bank-dominiertes Finanzsystem heraus, in
dem Bankeinlagen sehr wohl eine LiquiditÄ atsversicherung darstellen. In diesem Fi-
nanzsystem sind nur die Banken am PrimÄ armarkt aktiv und partizipieren darÄ uber
hinaus auch am SekundÄ armarkt. SÄ amtliche private Haushalte handeln hingegen nur
am SekundÄ armarkt.
In einem zweiten Schritt wird der E®ekt untersucht, der vom Zusammenbruch
einer Bank auf das gesamte Finanzsystem ausgeht. Interessanterweise zeigt sich hier,
dass ein Run auf eine Bank weder in einem markt-orientierten noch in einem stark
bank-dominierten Finanzsystem zu Ansteckungse®ekten Ä uber den Finanzmarkt fÄ uhrt.
Nur in schwach bank-dominierten (oder hybriden) Finanzsystemen verursachen die
NotverkÄ aufe von langfristigen Finanztiteln durch eine illiquide Bank einen Preisverfall
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The ¯nancial systems of the major industrialized economies di®er to a large extent. In
general, the German ¯nancial system and the ¯nancial system of the Anglo-Saxon type
are perceived as the two polar extremes between which all other developed countries can
be classi¯ed.1
One of the main respects in which the German and Anglo-Saxon ¯nancial systems di®er
is the relative importance of banks and markets in channelling funds saved by households
to investing ¯rms. While in the US the ratio of bank assets to GDP in 1993 was only
about a third of the respective German ratio, the reverse holds for the relation of equity
market capitalization to GDP: Here the ratio in Germany was about a third of the US
¯gure.2 Correspondingly, households' direct holdings (and indirect holdings via pension
funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds) of ¯nancial claims against the non-¯nancial
private sector are much higher in the US than in Germany, where households still invest a
larger proportion of their portfolio in cash and cash equivalents (i.e. demand deposits).3
But not only the size of the banking sector di®ers in the two contrasting ¯nancial systems,
the structure of the banking sector is also quite distinct. In the US the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933 decreed a separation of commercial banking activities and investment banking that
- although gradually relaxed in recent decades - continues to have an e®ect. Deposit-taking
and loan-granting banks still rarely underwrite securities and do not generally invest in
equity holdings. In contrast, German banks are mainly universal banks that take deposits
and grant loans, while at the same time underwriting securities and holding large stakes
in equity and other securities of private corporations.4
As pointed out in Allen and Gale (1995) these particular di®erences in the institutional
structure enable the two distinct ¯nancial systems to deal more or less e±ciently with
di®erent types of risks. While the market-based ¯nancial system provides households
with a richer menu of ¯nancial instruments to hedge against cross-sectional risks, bank-
¤I would like to thank Christian Pfeil and Marcel Tyrell for fruitful discussions and very useful sug-
gestions. I am also indebted to Patrick Bolton, JÄ urgen Eichberger and Elu von Thadden for very helpful
comments.
1See Allen and Gale (2000a), chapter 1.
2See Allen and Gale (2000a), table 3.1, p.48.
3See Allen and Gale (2000a), table 3.4, p.51.
4Allen and Gale (2000a), p. 52-59 and p. 71-74.
1dominated ¯nancial systems are more e±cient in smoothing non-diversi¯able aggregate
shocks over time and in providing insurance against idiosyncratic risks if markets are
incomplete due to problems of asymmetric information.
It was not only the introduction of the euro, in particular, but also the global stock
market boom at the end of the nineties as well as the privatization of large public en-
terprises that seem to have initiated a change in the German ¯nancial system towards
a stronger market orientation.5 The integration of the ¯nancial markets within the euro
area has increased ¯nancial markets' depth and liquidity, making market-based ¯nanc-
ing more attractive for borrowers and investors alike.6 In other euro-area countries, such
as France, these recent developments speeded up a general tendency towards a stronger
market-orientation that was already being observed since the deregulation and liberaliza-
tion of the late eighties.
One eminent question that is attached to these observations is whether the fragility of
the ¯nancial system in the euro area, and particularly in Germany, has been increased by
these most recent developments.7 Or, to put the question more generally: is the stability
of a ¯nancial system in a phase of transition from a bank-dominated towards a market-
oriented ¯nancial system more endangered than either a bank-based or a market-based
system? Are the risks of ¯nancial contagion higher in hybrid ¯nancial systems, which have
neither very liquid ¯nancial markets nor an extremely powerful banking industry?
In the ¯rst part of this paper, we model a simple economy in which a ¯nancial mar-
ket and deposit-taking banks coexist since a certain fraction of households cannot invest
as e±ciently as the bank at the ¯nancial market. Households are subject to idiosyn-
cratic intertemporal preference shocks, which cannot be veri¯ed by the public. Therefore,
only banks can provide an e±cient liquidity insurance against these shocks. Within this
framework, depending on the proportion of households with inferior direct investment op-
portunities, two distinct ¯nancial systems emerge displaying rudimentarily most of the
above-mentioned features: With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving ¯nancial
system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only enable those
households that cannot e±ciently invest directly themselves to bene¯t from investments
in the corporate sector. Banks are not active in the secondary ¯nancial market nor do they
provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households, by contrast, participate
to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary ¯nancial markets. In the other
case of a higher fraction of households without e±cient direct investment opportunities, a
bank-dominated ¯nancial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation,
5See European Central Bank (2002c) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2000)
6See Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001)
7A conjecture particularly emphasized in Rajan and Zingales (2002), also raised in Danthine, Giavazzi,
Vives, and von Thadden (1999) as well as in Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell (1999) and dealt with in
European Central Bank (2002a,b).
2are active in secondary ¯nancial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while
households only participate in secondary ¯nancial markets.
The second part of the paper uses this model to analyze how a changing structure of a
¯nancial system a®ects its stability. With regard to this framework, the degree of ¯nancial
stability is given by the ability of the ¯nancial system to cope with a run on a single bank.
Therefore, at the heart of this analysis is a certain channel of ¯nancial contagion that runs
through the capital market by taking the following steps:
² Because of concerns about the stability of an individual bank its depositors withdraw
on a large scale.
² The bank has to raise additional liquidity to meet the withdrawals. In order to do
so, the bank has to sell-o® its long-term assets.
² Since some of the former depositors prefer to hoard money instead of investing it at
the ¯nancial market, these ¯re sales cause signi¯cant asset price deteriorations.
² In general, banks partially rely on liquidity which they raise by selling long-term
assets. Thus, if the asset prices drop owing to ¯re sales of an individual bank this
worsens the liquidity position of other banks, driving them into crisis as well.
Though the model cannot account for the formation of an asset price bubble often
observed as preceding a ¯nancial crisis, it reasonably captures the self-enforcing process
between asset price deteriorations and the escalating collapse of the banking system which
is often observed during ¯nancial crises.8
But, interestingly, this vicious circle only occurs in weakly bank-dominated (or hybrid)
¯nancial systems. Neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems do ¯re sales of long-term ¯nancial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop
in asset prices that is large enough to precipitate other banks into crisis. The reasoning
is rather straightforward: In market-oriented ¯nancial systems banks do not trade in the
secondary ¯nancial market. They do not depend on liquidity raised by selling assets.
However, besides the fact that there is no direct e®ect on the banks' liquidity position, the
incentive of depositors to withdraw their deposits to buy assets cheaply is limited since
markets are deep and the initial price e®ect of the ¯re sales is therefore limited. On the
contrary, in strongly bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, markets tend to be illiquid and
the price e®ects of ¯re sales are therefore extreme. However, in these ¯nancial systems
the trading volume of banks in relation to banks' total assets is low enough. So banks can
compensate for losses due to price deteriorations. In hybrid ¯nancial systems, in contrast,
this ratio is so high that banks cannot bu®er the losses and collapse.
8See, for instance, the collection of stylized facts in Lai (2002), p.3-5, and the outline of the major crises
of the last two decades in Allen and Gale (2001a), p.43/44.
31.2 Relationship to the literature
The role of banks as an e±cient risk-sharing mechanism in an environment in which house-
holds face unobservable liquidity shocks and in which the yield curve of real investments
has a positive slope is obviously borrowed from the seminal work of Diamond and Dyb-
vig (1983). In their model they show that, in contrast to ¯nancial markets, demandable
debt contracts provide an incentive compatible insurance mechanism that allows for some
consumption smoothing between households which turn out to have immediate consump-
tion needs and those that are willing to wait: Demand deposits of a monopolistic bank
implement an e±cient redistribution from patient households - i.e. long-run depositors -
to households with early consumption wishes.
But as we try to model an economy in which deposit-taking banks exist simultaneously
with ¯nancial markets, the paper takes up the extensive discussion on the possibility of
such a coexistence, which started with Jacklin (1987). He showed that, in the standard
framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the liquidity insurance of deposit contracts
supplied by banks is not incentive compatible for households that turn out to be patient
if a ¯nancial market coexists. If there is an exit option of switching to an investment at
the ¯nancial market, depositors who turn out not to have an immediate need for liquidity
will expost not be willing to bear the cross-subsidies to impatient depositors implied by
the optimal deposit contract. See von Thadden (1999) for a survey of the literature which
analyzes the additional frictions, that have to be incorporated into the framework in order
to allow for a bank that provides liquidity insurance in the presence of existing ¯nancial
markets .
Amongst these approaches my model is closest in spirit to Diamond (1997). By assum-
ing that expost - after liquidity shocks have been realized - only a fraction of the patient
depositors can really access the ¯nancial market, Diamond (1997) shows that the bank
can at least implement a liquidity insurance which is more e±cient than the intertemporal
return structure provided by the ¯nancial market. Therefore, by assuming a constraint
in the participation of households at the ¯nancial markets, Diamond (1997) models an
economy in which banks and markets can coexist. As the fraction of households without
access to the ¯nancial market increases, the degree of liquidity insurance increases and
converges to the optimal risk-sharing scheme.
My model di®ers from Diamond (1997) in three respects. Firstly, in the present model,
households know exante (when signing a deposit contract) whether they will have access
to the ¯nancial markets or not. But the bank does not have that information concerning
every single household. It only knows the overall fraction of households that will be able
to participate in the ¯nancial market. This seemingly small di®erence in the framework
allows the endogenous generation of the two distinct ¯nancial systems by simply varying
the fraction of households with ¯nancial market access. Secondly, we additionally assume
4that the economy is divided into two regions. In both regions, one bank is the monopo-
listic supplier of deposit contracts. This additional assumption allows an analysis of the
interplay among banks at the ¯nancial market. In particular, the e®ect of ¯re sales by
an individual distressed bank on the ¯nancial market and, ultimately, on the other bank
can be analyzed. Thirdly, in contrast to Diamond (1997), no household faces in¯nitely
high transaction costs when participating in the ¯nancial market in the present model.
Owing to informational disadvantages, some households cannot reap the entire return of
direct investments. Even though the expected shortfall in return on direct investments is
prohibitively high during normal times, if ¯re sales caused by a bank run depress asset
prices severely it may become bene¯cial, even for these households, to hold ¯nancial claims
against the corporate sector directly.
There are several papers that also model regional monopolistic banks in an approach
based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and analyze contagion between these banks through
¯nancial markets.9 But most of this literature deals with propagation mechanisms which
run through the interbank market. Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (2000), for instance,
show that, if banks are linked by the interbank market and aggregate liquidity shocks are
sequentially correlated, a run on a single bank serves as a signal for depositors of other
banks to withdraw, triggering o® the collapse of the entire banking system. In contrast
to these informational spill-overs, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) and Allen and Gale
(2000b) put forward a contagion mechanism that draws on the credit exposure between
banks. While interbank loans are motivated very di®erently in these two approaches,
their main ¯ndings tend to be similar. The unexpected default of an interbank loan or the
unexpected refusal to roll over such a credit because of a crisis at one bank can push the
related banks into a liquidity crisis as well. What is particularly interesting in both models
is the observation that the propagation of this crisis to larger parts of the ¯nancial system
depends on the structure of the interbank market. On the one hand, the smaller the
number of other banks with which one institution is (directly and indirectly) interlinked,
the larger is the part of the banking sector whose stability is irrelevant to the particular
institute's soundness. On the other hand, the more complete the interconnection between
the banks is, the more diversi¯ed they are and the more likely it is that they can withstand
a default of an individual institution.
The propagation mechanism put forward in my model is most closely related to the
channel of ¯nancial contagion described in Allen and Gale (2001b). In their approach,
banks - instead of granting each other credit as in Allen and Gale (2000b) and Freixas,
Parigi, and Rochet (2000) - trade long-term assets to reallocate liquidity within the banking
sector. In equilibrium there are always banks that try to sell these ¯nancial claims because
they are in need of liquidity and others that have excess liquidity and prefer to invest it.
9See Lai (2002) for a broader survey of di®erent channels of ¯nancial contagion and also for a more
general overview on contagion in the banking sector.
5But if asset prices deteriorate owing to unexpected ¯re sales of one institution, some other
banks that rely on a certain liquidity in°ow from asset sales may collapse.
However, contrary to Allen and Gale (2001b), in the present model the asset market
is not an interbank market. Instead, as already discussed, we follow Diamond (1997)
and assume that households participate in this ¯nancial market, too. Besides the fact
that this seems to be a more realistic picture of the asset market, it brings about an
entirely di®erent motive for banks to sell assets. Here rather than trading assets to re-
allocate liquidity after negatively correlated aggregate liquidity shocks have occurred in
the di®erent regions, banks hold some of their long-term claims in order to sell them to
households that turn out to be patient. But more importantly by varying the fraction of
those households that can e±ciently invest directly at the ¯nancial market this approach
allows to analyze the strength of the described contagion mechanism in di®erent ¯nancial
systems. A growing market participation of households increases market depth, reduces
liquidity transformation at banks and extends the expected volume of assets traded. The
present paper examines the question of how these e®ects interact with respect to the risk
of contagion caused by the depressing e®ect of asset price deteriorations after ¯re sales by
a collapsing institution.
2 The framework
Agents, preferences, and technologies: The economy is assumed to last two periods
and to consist of a linear city of measure 2 with a continuum of households living along the




u(c1) with probability q
u(c2) with probability 1 ¡ q
(1)
The uncertainty concerning the preferred date of consumption is resolved in t = 1: At
this point in time it becomes clear to every single household whether it is patient - i.e.
wants to consume in t = 2 - or whether it is impatient and only appreciates consumption
goods in t = 1. Owing to the law of large numbers, the aggregate amount of patient and
impatient consumers is given by 2¢(1 ¡ q) and 2¢q, respectively. To simplify notation, we
assume a utility function with constant relative risk-aversion:
u0 (ct) = c¡a
t a > 1
There are two production technologies available in the economy: First, there is a pub-
licly available storage technology which does not pay any interest but enables investors to
transfer resources between any two successive points in time. Second, there is a continuum
of entrepreneurs in the economy without any initial endowment, but owning a production
technology. Entrepreneurs can decide in t = 1 either to \behave" or to \shirk". If they
6behave they spend full e®ort on their long-term production project generating a return of
R in t = 2 for every unit invested in t = 0. If they shirk, they spend less e®ort on the
project increasing their private utility but reducing the production of the project to ° ¢R,
with R > 1 > ° ¢R > 0. If liquidated in t = 1 the return of a project is always ² ! 0. The







behave ¡1 0 R
shirk ¡1 0 ° ¢ R
liquidated ¡1 ² ! 0 0
Financial institutions: There exists a ¯nancial market which is located in the centre
of the linear city at measure 1. To invest in the long-term and productive technology,
households have to use the ¯nancial market, whereas to store their initial endowment
they can directly invest in the short-term technology. In t = 0 households can invest
at the primary ¯nancial market in the long-term technology by buying ¯nancial claims
from an entrepreneur. Since an excess demand for funds is assumed, funds are scarce
and competition among entrepreneurs will result in an equilibrium promised repayment
of R in t = 2 for every unit invested in t = 0. At the secondary ¯nancial market in
t = 1 households can trade ¯nancial claims on the long-term investment against t = 1
consumption goods with other agents. In t = 2 entrepreneurs pay out the actual return
of the project to the current holder of a ¯nancial claim.
Households are divided into two groups. Type A households - located within a distance
of (1 ¡ i) to the left and to the right of the ¯nancial market - can monitor entrepreneurs
perfectly. In addition, when investing in a project, type A households immediately learn
how to replace a misbehaving entrepreneur without forgoing any of the expected return of
the project. Thus type A households can assert the entrepreneurial e®ort level necessary
to realize the return R for every unit invested. In contrast, type B households - farther
away from the market - cannot monitor entrepreneurs. Therefore, entrepreneurs ¯nanced
by those households will always shirk and type B households can only realize a return of
° ¢ R even if the ¯nancial claim on that ¯rm promises a return of R in t = 2.
Besides direct investment opportunities households can deposit money with a bank. A
bank is a ¯nancial institute that can o®er a deposit contract against the initial endowment
of households and invest the collected goods in the storage technology and in ¯nancial
claims on long-term investments bought at the t = 0 ¯nancial market. Banks can also
7trade in the secondary ¯nancial market at t = 1. There is a bank located at both endpoints
of the city. A bank is the monopolistic supplier of deposit contracts to the households
next to it. But each local banking market is a contestable market.
| {z } | {z }
Type B Type A
Bank 1 Bank 2 Market
i 1 ¡ i
z }| { z }| {
Region 1 Region 2
Figure 1
Banks just like type A households can monitor and assert the e±cient e®ort level
of entrepreneurs perfectly. But in contrast to type A households banks can - as put
forward in Diamond and Rajan (2001) - by setting up deposit contracts avert the moral
hazard problem: Type A households could, in general, also collect funds from type B
households and invest them into long-term projects. Since they can e±ciently monitor
the entrepreneurs they could promise the type B households a repayment of up to R. But
type B households cannot achieve that repayment. If the type A household would renege
on the repayment and o®er to pay just ° ¢R the type B households could not do better by
forcing the type A household to deliver the ¯nancial claim against the entrepreneur. So
any promised repayment of type A households that exceeds °¢R would not be credible. In
contrast, the liquidity transformation of deposit ¯nanced banks makes them vulnerable to
runs. But precisely because of the threat to run and to withdraw all deposits if the bank
attempts to renegotiate on the promised repayment depositors can enforce the promised
repayment. So the collective action problem that is inherent in deposit contracts and that
brings about the fragility of individual banks enables them to credibly commit to pass on
the returns on the long-term project.10
For simplicity we assume that both regions are symmetric with respect to the set of
parameters.
10For a broader exposition of that argument see also Diamond and Rajan (2000).
83 The Financial System at Work
3.1 Some basic e®ects
To gain an intuition of the mechanics of the model it is useful to start the analysis with
the equilibrium on one side of the market (one region) and gradually aggravate infor-
mational asymmetries. We thus ¯rst assume that all the characteristics of an individual
household are observable: The realization of the intertemporal preference shock, i.e. its
individual liquidity needs, and whether it is of type A or B is both public information.
The only friction in the economy is the inability of type B households to collect the entire
promised repayment of a ¯nancial contract other than a deposit contract. Therefore, these
households cannot bene¯t from the e±cient long-term production technology with a direct
investment.
Since liquidity needs are publicly observable and type A households can collect the
entire return from the long-term production technology, those households can set up an
e±cient risk-sharing mechanism. One possible way could be by issuing two types of Arrow-
Debreu securities. The ¯rst promises a payment of 1 in t = 1 to the buyer of the contract
if he turns out to be impatient and nothing if he is patient; the second delivers in t = 1
the holder - if he is patient - a ¯nancial claim against an entrepreneur that promises to
pay 1 in t = 2. The cost of supplying an additional unit of the ¯rst contract in t = 0 is
q.11 For providing an additional unit of the other contract paying 1 to patient consumers
in t = 2, the resources needed in t=0 are
(1¡q)
R .12 In order to get households to supply
both types of contracts, the relative price has to be equal to the relation of the costs.
Since households will adjust their demand for these insurance contracts up to the point
where the relation of expected marginal utility if patient to expected marginal utility if
impatient is equal to the relative price of the insurance contracts, the equilibrium condition
describing the e±cient risk sharing scheme is given by
q ¢ u0(cA
1 )
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R ¡ (R ¡ R
1
®) ¢ (1 ¡ q)
)
(3)
11In order to perfectly diversify, an equal fraction of this additional unit is supplied to all other house-
holds. A fraction q of these other households will become impatient and therefore has to be paid 1, which
is e±ciently provided by investing in the storage technology.
12To a fraction (1 ¡ q) the claim has to be delivered in t = 1. A claim paying R in t = 2 is o®ered at a
price of 1 in t = 0. A claim paying 1 therefore costs
1
R.
9In contrast to type A households, households of type B have to use a deposit contract
in order to bene¯t from the higher productivity of the long-term production technology.
Since the local banking market is a contestable market, banks are not able to make any
pro¯t from these e±ciency gains. Quite the reverse: they have to o®er type B households
the utility maximizing deposit contract fdB
1 ;dB




















s.t. q ¢ dB
1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢
dB
2
R · 1 (BC)
Solving the Lagrangian implied by (PB1) shows that the optimal deposit contract pro-
vides type B households with the same e±cient risk-sharing scheme that type A household
realize by ¯nancial market transactions. Therefore, taking the assumed utility function










2 g = fcA
1 ;cA
2 g (4)
Thus, in this setting where no informational asymmetries concerning the households
are assumed, the only function of a bank is to provide an e±cient mechanism for type B
households to bene¯t from the e±cient production technology and implement the e±cient
investment portfolio in the economy.13
This changes dramatically if we now assume that individual liquidity needs are private
information. Information concerning the type of a particular household we continue to
take as publicly available for the moment. As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) already put
forward in this framework, banks but not markets can provide e±cient liquidity insurance.
The reason for this is that, if the preference shock is not publicly observable, any contract
has to be expost incentive compatible: in t = 1, neither patient nor impatient households
must have an incentive to pretend to be of the other type.
However, the insurance contracts which provided type A households with the e±cient
risk-sharing in the previous setting are no longer incentive compatible. To show this,
note that given that all type A households continue to hold insurance contracts against
each other, an individual type A household could bene¯t from investing only into long-
term ¯nancial claims: if he turns out to be patient he can consume R > cA
2 , whereas
if he is impatient he can o®er his ¯nancial claims at the t = 1 ¯nancial market. Some
of the patient type A households - holding insurance contracts with all other type A
households - will pretend to be impatient, obtain liquidity from the insurance contract
and use the liquidity to buy these long-term claims. They will have an incentive to do so
until they have bid up the price p1;2 of a long-term claim paying R in t = 2 expressed in
13Note that if banks were not available type B household would only invest in the storage technology.
10t = 1 consumption goods to (R)
®¡1
® .14 Thus, the impatient type A household, which has
invested its entire endowment in long-term assets and sells them in t = 1 at the ¯nancial
market, obtains t = 1 consumption goods which amount to (R)
®¡1
® > cA
1 . Therefore, the
expected utility of a type A household which directly invests into the corporate sector
is higher than the expected utility a type A household realizes if it only holds insurance
contracts. Thus all type A households have an incentive to invest directly. However, if
all type A households invest only in the long-run project there are no patient type A
households to which ¯nancial claims could be sold if the holder turns out to be impatient.
Thus, the price of ¯nancial claims would fall to zero. Therefore, in equilibrium there must
be some patient type A households who have t = 1 consumption goods to o®er. They can
either provide this liquidity by investing exante into the storage technology or by holding
insurance contracts and pretending to be impatient. In equilibrium, however, if all patient
type A households holding an insurance contract claim to be impatient, the expected cost
of this insurance contract is 1. Thus, the insurance contract can only o®er the same return
structure as the storage technology - the insurance contract is therefore redundant.
Moreover, to have in equilibrium both households which hold liquidity and households
which invest in long-term claims, the equilibrium price at the t = 1 ¯nancial market
must ensure that households are exante indi®erent between these two alternatives. The
expected utility of investing directly (q ¢u(p1;2)+(1¡q)¢u(R)) is obviously only equal to
the expected utility of holding liquidity (q ¢ u(1) + (1 ¡ q) ¢ u( R
p1;2)) if p1;2 = 1.
But if patient type A households pretend to be impatient in order to obtains the
liquidity in t = 1, the underlying insurance contracts can no longer be an equilibrium.
The equilibrium insurance contracts which take into account the asymmetry of infor-
mation concerning the liquidity preferences of the individual households can only provide
impatient households with a consumption of 1 in t = 1 and patient ones with a t = 1
delivery of a ¯nancial claim paying R in t = 2. The corresponding equilibrium price in
the ¯nancial market is p1;2 = 1. It is only under these conditions that neither a patient
nor an impatient type A household has an incentive to pretend to have other than its true
liquidity preference and households are indi®erent between buying insurance contracts and
investing directly. This is because type A households can realize the same consumption
plan by directly investing in either the storage or the long-term production technology
and selling long-term claims against liquidity in t = 1 at p1;2 = 1 if becoming impatient or
buying them with held liquidity if they turn out to be patient. Thus, at the equilibrium
price, incentive compatible insurance contracts are redundant and the ¯nancial markets
14To see this note that patient type A households will be indi®erent between getting the payment speci¯ed
in the insurance contract for patient households and claiming to be impatient and use the liquidity to buy


















= R and fcA
2 ;cA
2 g = f1;Rg (5)
The question that now arises is what deposit contracts the banks will o®er and how
banks and their deposit contracts interact with the equilibrium in the t = 1 ¯nancial
market.
Since the type of a particular household has so far been assumed to be observable,






o®ered to type T 2 fA;Bg households solves the program (PT2). Thus it
maximizes the particular expected utility subject to the per capita budget constraint (BC)
and a type speci¯c incentive compatibility constraint (IC). This incentive compatibility
constraint is the only thing that distinguishes contracts designed for type A from those
for type B households. In general, it states that returns to long-term depositors must
not be smaller than the maximum returns a patient depositor can realize, if he withdraws
in t = 1 and either invests the money at the ¯nancial market or stores it until t = 2.
While ¡TR with ¡A = 1 and ¡B = ° describes the type speci¯c enforceable repayment
on one unit of a ¯nancial asset, p1;2 stands for the price of a ¯nancial claim expressed in
t = 1 consumption goods, sold at the t = 1 ¯nancial market and promising a repayment
of R in t = 2. Therefore ¡T¢R
p1;2 are the type speci¯c enforceable returns of a unit of t = 1
consumption goods invested at the ¯nancial market.
(PT2)
8
> > > <















s.t. q ¢ dT
1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢
dT
2









As the solution to this problem shows (see appendix A) the optimal contract implies















with T 2 fA;Bg, ¡A = 1 and ¡B = °.
In order to entirely describe the optimal deposit contract one ¯nally has to show that
the equilibrium price on the ¯nancial market is still p1;2 = 1. The easiest way to do so
works by contradiction:




®. In that case, the incentive compatibility constraint would be re-
dundant for both types of households and the bank could o®er type A and type B
households a contract that implements the optimal risk sharing. Thus, all house-
holds would prefer to hold their wealth with the bank and the only agents potentially
12trading in the ¯nancial markets would be banks. However, if p1;2 > 1, banks would
only invest in long-term claims, planning to provide the liquidity needed for the pay-
ment to short-term depositors by selling parts of these claims. This would increase






p1;2. In this situation, the incentive compatibility constraint of type
A households is binding. Therefore, in comparison with the ¯nancial market, the
bank could not provide any additional liquidity insurance to this type of household.
Consequently, only type B households would deposit their wealth with the bank,
which would still invest their total resources in long-term claims. Type A households,
just like the bank, would also prefer to invest their entire wealth directly in ¯rms,
expecting to sell these stakes o® if they turn out to be impatient.
Thus, if agents in the economy in t = 0 expect the price in the ¯nancial market in
t = 1 to be p1;2 > 1, nobody in the entire economy would invest exante in the storage
technology, although in t = 1 there is a strong demand for liquidity. This obviously cannot
be an equilibrium.
Similarly, if one assumes p1;2 < 1 all resources of the economy would be stored, since
agents would gain if they meet their requirements of long-term assets at the t = 1 ¯nancial
market. Although there is a demand for ¯nancial claims in t = 1, no one in the economy





p1;2 holds, type B
households again only hold deposits with the bank. But, since holding liquidity to buy
long-term assets in the ¯nancial market in t = 1 dominates an investment in a ¯rm in
t = 0, both the banks and the type A households will only store goods from t = 0 to t = 1.




®, nobody holds deposits with the
bank but both type A and type B households will store their total resources from t = 0
to t = 1. Thus p1;2 < 1 cannot be an equilibrium either.
Only at p1;2 = 1 banks and agents are indi®erent between investing and storing re-
sources and a positive amount of ¯nancial claims and liquidity will be held.
Inserting the equilibrium price p1;2 = 1 into the type speci¯c optimal deposit contract
shows that the contract o®ered to type B households provides them with the optimal risk
sharing. In contrast, the binding incentive compatibility constraint of type A households
prevents the bank from o®ering to these households a deposit contract that e±ciently in-
sures them against individual liquidity shocks. Moreover, because of the binding incentive
compatibility constraint, the deposit contract o®ered to type A households only resembles
the return structure those households can realize by investing directly at the ¯nancial
market. Given a weak preference for investing directly at the ¯nancial market, type A
households will not hold deposits with their bank.
Figure 2 shows the optimal contracts. The optimal contracts maximize the strictly
concave utility function subject to two linear constraints - the budget constraint and the
13respective incentive compatibility constraint. The graphical representation of the budget
constraint is derived by solving (BC) for dT
2 . We obtain a downward sloped line with a




p1;2 - this condition being di®erent for the two types A and B. Therefore, the
two contracts also vary. While the optimal contract o®ered to type B households is given
by the point of tangency between the budget constraint and the indi®erence curve, the
contract o®ered to type A households is given by the point where the budget line and the
incentive compatibility constraint intersect. The dotted lines in the two ¯gures represent
the optimal risk-sharing condition. Note that only the contract of type B provides them









. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Type B Type A

























3.2 The bank-based ¯nancial system
In reality, the return a household can realize by holding ¯nancial claims cannot be ob-
served directly by a bank. Thus, in fact, not only the intertemporal preference shock of
a household is its private information, the e®ective return of its investment opportunities
are also subject to an asymmetric information distribution. Therefore, a more realistic
framework should assume that - besides the individual liquidity needs - the particular type
(A or B) of a household is also not publicly observable. However, if the type of an indi-
vidual household is no longer assumed to be public information, a bank can only continue
to o®er type-speci¯c contracts if these contracts are self-revealing: Type A households
must have an incentive to choose the contract designed for these households, while type
B households must pick the contracts designated for them.
Showing that the optimal deposit contracts calculated in the previous setting are not
self-revealing is straightforward. Obviously, type A households do not have an incentive
14to choose the contracts designated for them. By pretending to be of type B, a type A
household is strictly better o®. If it becomes impatient it can consume dB
1 > 1, while it
can withdraw and invest at the ¯nancial market earning R ¢ dB




















Figure 3 illustrates the argument that the optimal contracts derived in the previous
section are no longer incentive compatible. As can easily be seen, type A households can
achieve a higher indi®erence curve by pretending to be of type B. The expected utility level
attached to this situation of misrepresentation is given by the indi®erence curve passing
through point A0.
However, the bank is not only unable to implement these type-speci¯c contracts, any
pair of separating contracts cannot be an equilibrium. To show this, note ¯rst that as long







type A households will always prefer to withdraw and invest at the ¯nancial market. Since
they will withdraw in t = 1 anyway, they will choose in t = 0 whatever contract promises
the higher t = 1 repayment. Therefore, in order to make the contract designed for type A
households preferable for them, the bank would have to increase dA




1 . Nevertheless, because all type A households withdraw in t = 1, the funds
provided by these households cannot be invested in the productive long-term technology.
A payment to type A households in t = 1 exceeding 1 is therefore only possible if the bank
uses returns on funds provided by type B households.15 Contracts for type B households
have to be used to cross-subsidize contracts for type A households. However, since the
local banking market is a contestable market, this situation cannot be an equilibrium.
Another potentially competing bank could always o®er a preferable contract to type B
15Since t = 2 payment to type A households can be reduced to zero while the contract for type B
households promises d
B
2 , type B households will favor their type speci¯c contract as long as q ¢ u(d
B0
1 ) +
(1 ¡ q) ¢ u(d
B0
2 ) > u(d
A
1 ) > u(1) holds.
15households attracting all households of this type, making the necessary cross-subsidies for
a pair of separating contracts infeasible. Thus, in equilibrium only pooling contracts are
feasible.
The equilibrium deposit contract the bank o®ers solves problem (P3). The objective
function is given by the expected utility of type B households. Since the optimal deposit
contract can be expected to provide more liquidity insurance than the market, patient
type A households will withdraw early. Remember, if the deposit contract incorporates
some liquidity insurance compared to the payment structure realizable by a direct market
investment, d2 < R
p1;2¢d1. However, if type A households always withdraw early irrespective
of their intertemporal consumption preferences, they are only interested in a very high
short-term repayment on deposits. Thus also taking into account the expected utility of
type A households when deriving the optimal deposit contract would imply a higher weight
on short-term payments than is optimal for type B households. The deposit contract
o®ered would provide type B households with a suboptimally high liquidity insurance.
(The detailed contract is derived in appendix B.) Therefore, a competitor could again
o®er a preferable contract to type B households, attracting all type B households and
making any liquidity insurance by the ¯rst bank impossible. Thus, in order to keep type
B households, the bank must optimize its deposit contract according to the needs of these
households.
The optimal deposit contract is restricted by a per capita budget constraint (BC),
which averages over type A and type B households taking into account the fact that type
A households withdraw in t = 1 anyway, whereas type B households leave their deposits
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max
d1;d2
q ¢ i ¢ u(d1) + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u(d2)
s.t. [q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)] ¢ d1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ d2













¢ d1 · d2 (ICB)
The type-speci¯c incentive compatibility constraints (ICA) and (ICB) guarantee that
patient type A households really have an incentive to withdraw early and patient type B
households are really better o® if they leave their money with the bank. These restrictions
ensure that the assumptions concerning the type-speci¯c behavior of patient households
re°ected in the budget constraint will indeed be observed in equilibrium.
16Maximizing the objective function taking only the budget constraint into account
yields a risk sharing provided by the pooling deposit contract which is characterized by















The optimal risk sharing program is also feasible according to the incentive compati-















Obviously, for the optimal pooling contract to be incentive compatible the equilibrium
price p1;2 in the t = 1 ¯nancial market is crucial. But, as can easily be shown, because of
the no-arbitrage restriction the equilibrium price is again p1;2 = 1:
If equation (7) and (8) hold, both type A and type B households deposit their total
funds with the bank in t = 0. Consequently, the entire issue of ¯nancial claims from the
corporate sector goes to the bank in the ¯rst place. Households are not active in the
primary ¯nancial market. Therefore, the existence of a secondary market at which type A
households can invest in t = 1 depends on the readiness of the bank to sell the long-term
assets. At ¯rst sight, one might think that by not selling any ¯nancial claims the bank
could prevent patient type A households from withdrawing early. But the competition
in the secondary ¯nancial market by the bank from the other region obstructs such an
(e±ciency-enhancing) behavior.
As soon as the bank in the other region expects bank 1 not to o®er ¯nancial claims,
bank 2 will invest additional funds in ¯rms in t = 0 in order to sell these ¯nancial claims
to patient type A depositors of bank 1 in t = 1. As long as p1;2 ¸ 1, this provides bank
2 with the needed t = 1 consumption goods more e±ciently than does storing. After
all, bank 1 will not be able to prevent patient type A households from withdrawing and
investing at the secondary market.
Therefore, rationing does not make any sense at all. It only causes an out°ow of
liquidity from region 1 to region 2, increasing the welfare in region 2 to the detriment of
region 1. In order to bene¯t likewise from this e±cient way of providing liquidity, it is
pro¯table for bank 1 to compete with bank 2 for the liquidity of patient type A depositors
in the secondary ¯nancial market.
Competition among banks in the secondary ¯nancial market will reduce the equilibrium
price of ¯nancial claims to p1;2 = 1. Only at that price are banks indi®erent between
17providing t = 1 consumption goods by storing or by selling long-term assets to patient
type A households in the ¯nancial market.
Since the equilibrium price is given by p1;2 = 1, the feasibility conditions for the optimal
deposit contract (7 and 8) can be reduced to R ¸ £ ¸ 1 which is true for all
i ¸ i =
1
q ¢ R®¡1 + (1 ¡ q)
(9)
In an economy characterized by a fraction of type B households which is larger than









R ¡ (R ¡ £) ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i
;
R ¢ £
R ¡ (R ¡ £) ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i
¾
(10)






, the deposit contract o®ered incorporates at least
some degree of liquidity insurance compared to the return structure of direct investments.
For an economy without any type A households (i = 1), this contract provides the optimal
risk sharing. But as the fraction of type A households increases and ¯nally approaches
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Figure 4
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal deposit contract in this setting. Compared to the
optimal contract o®ered to type B households when types are publicly observable (see
¯gure 2), the budget constraint is turned clockwise around point f1;Rg. The budget
constraint is all the steeper, the higher is the fraction (1¡i) of type A households - those
households that always withdraw in t = 1. The point of tangency between the budget
constraint and the indi®erence curve characterizing the optimal contract moves to the
upper left, the higher (1¡i) and the steeper the budget constraint is. Therefore, the risk
sharing implied by the deposit contract converges from optimal risk sharing (R
1
®) to the
risk sharing scheme provided by market investments as (1 ¡ i) increases.
18As was already assumed in the per capita budget constraint (BC), the bank provides
the funds needed for the promised repayment in t = 1 and t = 2 e±ciently. This means
that the t = 2 consumption goods needed for the payments to long-term depositors are
produced by investing in the production technology and not by storing the funds for two
periods. Similarly, the t = 1 consumption goods for the payments to impatient consumers
are assumed to be provided by stored funds (and not by liquidating long-term projects).
However, since there exists a ¯nancial market in t = 1, at which ¯nancial claims are traded
against t = 1 this does not necessarily mean that the bank has to invest the funds in t = 0
accordingly. Moreover, as the equilibrium price in the ¯nancial market will be p1;2 = 1,
any portfolio is the same for an individual bank.
The only thing that matters is the aggregate portfolio in the economy. Since the t = 1
¯nancial market can only reallocate existing liquidity and ¯nancial claims, for the economy
as a whole already in t = 0 the aggregate liquidity held by banks (lBD
1 + lBD
2 ) has to be




2 = 2 ¢ q ¢ dBD
1 (11)
The long-term ¯nancial claims bought in t = 0 by the banking sector of the economy
serve two purposes. One fraction is supposed to earn the aggregate t = 2 consumption
goods for the patient type B households of both regions: 2¢(1¡q)¢i¢
dBD
2
R . The other fraction
is held in order to be sold in the t = 1 ¯nancial market to patient type A households.
Since patient type A households pay the price p1;2 = 1 for a ¯nancial claim at the ¯nancial
market with the short-run return on deposits,16 this fraction of held capital is given by
2 ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 . Thus aggregate capital (kBD
1 + kBD
2 ) in the portfolio adds up to
kBD
1 + kBD




+ 2 ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 (12)
In general, the way in which the shares of liquidity and of long-term ¯nancial claims
in the aggregate portfolio are initially split among the banks is undetermined. For the
sake of simplicity, we concentrate on the symmetric equilibrium,17 in which each bank
j 2 f1;2g holds the same portfolio - half of the aggregate long-term claims and half of the
aggregate liquidity
lBD
j = q ¢ dBD
1 (13)
kBD




+ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1
16It is interesting to note that this fraction of short-term deposits could be interpreted as inside money
within this model.
17This could be justi¯ed, for instance, by assuming in¯nitesimal trading costs of banks.
19In this case, both regions are self-su±cient. No liquidity is exchanged against long-
term claims between regions. Each bank pays (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 to its patient type
A households which use these funds to demand long-term assets from their bank at p1;2.
Therefore, the ¯nancial market is in equilibrium since the capital supply ks
j of each bank
meets the capital demand kd
j of its patient type A households at the same price for all
banks.
ks
j = (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 (14)
kd





To sum up, if the fraction of households that can e±ciently invest directly in a ¯rm
is comparatively low (i > i), our model economy shows basic features of a bank-based
¯nancial system:
1. Banks not only economize on transaction costs, i.e. provide access to e±cient in-
vestment opportunities for all households, they also provide liquidity insurance to
their depositors.
2. Banks are active in the secondary ¯nancial market.
They are the dominant (or only) player in the primary ¯nancial market.
3. Households are not engaged in the primary market.
They only demand long-term claims at the secondary ¯nancial market.
3.3 The market-oriented ¯nancial system
Now we turn to the case in which the share of type A households exceeds the critical
threshold level (1 ¡ i). To see why the optimal deposit contract o®ered by the banks
in the previous setting is no longer an equilibrium if i < i we turn to the graphical
representation of the optimization problem.
As shown in ¯gure 5, an increase in the fraction of type A households beyond (1 ¡ i)
would further increase the steepness of the budget constraint so that the point of tangency
(D0) between the budget constraint and the indi®erence curve moves to the upper left of
A = (1;R). However, this is inconsistent with the assumption underlying the budget
constraint that all type A households withdraw their deposits in t = 1 irrespective of their
liquidity needs. By withdrawing and investing the funds at the ¯nancial market, type A
households can only realize the consumption bundle given by point D00. This obviously
provides them with less utility than point D0, which they could reach by behaving just
like type B households, withdrawing only when having immediate consumption needs.
Thus, given a deposit contract D0, patient type A households would not withdraw, which
contradicts the assumption of the budget constraint.
20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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On the other hand, the bank cannot simply optimize the deposit contract subject to the
budget constraint (BC) in (P4), assuming patient type A households keep their deposits
until t = 2. This would induce the bank to o®er a deposit contract with the optimal risk
sharing £ = R
1
®. But given this contract, patient type A households would again prefer
to withdraw early.
Thus, the optimal deposit contract that can be o®ered by the bank in this setting
has to take into account that type A households must not have an incentive to withdraw
their money in t = 1. In the optimization problem (P4), this restriction is captured by
the changed incentive compatibility constraint of patient type A households (ICA). Note,
that in (P4), since arbitrage conditions for the equilibrium price in the t = 1 ¯nancial
market remained the same, p1;2 is already set to 1.18
(P4)
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> > > > > <
> > > > > :
max
d1;d2
q ¢ i ¢ u(d1) + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u(d2)
s.t. q ¢ d1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ d2
R · 1 (BC)
maxf1;Rg ¢ d1 · d2 (ICA)
maxf1;°Rg ¢ d1 · d2 (ICB)
As can easily be seen, the maximum risk sharing the bank can provide with its deposit
contract in this setting is determined by the incentive compatibility constraint of type
A households. Any deposit contract that would provide a smoother consumption pro¯le
than the returns realizable at the ¯nancial market is not incentive compatible. Thus, banks
cannot provide liquidity insurance in an economy where the fraction of type A households
exceeds (1¡i). Inserting the binding incentive compatibility constraint of patient type A
18It is only at this equilibrium price that market participants will not invest their entire resources into
the long-term technology (which would be the case if p1;2 > 1) nor hold all their funds in liquid reserves
until t = 1 (which they would do if in equilibrium p1;2 < 1).
21households into the budget constraint gives the optimal deposit contract a bank can o®er







As we assume an exante weak preference of households for investing directly at the
¯nancial market if both investments have the same payo®s,19 in equilibrium the two types
of households will follow a very di®erent investment strategy. While type A households
will hold a portfolio of liquidity and direct ¯nancial claims against the corporate sector,
type B households will invest their entire wealth in deposits.
Given the returns on the deposit contract, the only function of banks in this regime is
obviously to enable type B households to bene¯t from the e±cient long-term production
technology. Thus, banks do not provide any liquidity insurance in this setting; they only
o®er a mechanism to commit credibly to pass e±ciency gains in investments owing to a
more e±cient monitoring to patient type B households.
At the t = 1 equilibrium price of p1;2 = 1 - just like in the case of the bank-based
¯nancial system - only the aggregate portfolio of the economy, i.e. liquidity and long-
term ¯nancial claims, respectively, held in sum by banks and type A households in the
two regions, is determined by the equilibrium conditions (but not the portfolio of the
individual banks). From the fact that all impatient households (type A as well as type B)
will consume 1 in t = 1, it follows that aggregate liquidity is simply given by
LMO = 2 ¢ q (17)
Similarly, since patient type A households as well as patient type B ones will be
provided with a t = 2 consumption of R, aggregate long-term investment in the economy
has to be
KMO = 2 ¢ (1 ¡ q) (18)
Imposing again the additional assumption of in¯nitesimal trading costs, it becomes
optimal for both banks to hold exactly the amount of liquidity needed for repayments to
impatient type B households of the respective region and invest the rest that ¯nances the
payment to the patient depositors in the long-term technology:
lMO
1 = lMO
2 = q ¢ i and kMO
1 = kMO
2 = (1 ¡ q) ¢ i (19)
The remaining liquidity and long-term investments,
lMO
A = 2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) and kMO
A = 2 ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ; (20)
19This weak preference can be interpreted as a shortcut for the costs of running a bank, which are shifted
to depositors.
22are held by type A households and reallocated at the t = 1 ¯nancial market according
to the patience of the individual households. The fraction q of type A households turns
out to be impatient and will therefore o®er their long-term ¯nancial claims at p1;2, while
the patient type A households demand long-term assets paying with their stored liquidity.
Therefore, the market equilibrium condition:
q ¢ p1;2 ¢ kMO
A = (1 ¡ q) ¢ lMO
A (21)
determines p1;2 = 1.
To sum up, in the parameter setting where the fraction of type A households is rela-
tively large (i < i), a ¯nancial system emerges, which can be interpreted as a sketch of a
market-oriented ¯nancial system:
1. Banks only economize on transaction costs, i.e. by providing an e±cient monitoring
mechanism they improve investment pro¯tability for disadvantaged households.
But they do not provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors.
2. Banks are (in the extreme case) inactive in the secondary ¯nancial market.
3. Households invest to a large extent directly at the ¯nancial market.
They are actively trading in the primary (or IPO market) as well as in the secondary
¯nancial market.
Thus, their trading volume is much larger than in the bank-based ¯nancial system.
4 Financial Crises
In this section we want to study the fragility of the two di®erent types of ¯nancial systems
described above. More speci¯cally, we want to analyze whether the impact of a single
bank's breakdown on the stability of the ¯nancial sector di®ers in the two distinct ¯nancial
systems.
To keep the setting as simple as possible, we assume that coordination failures are the
reason for a bank run. Extending the model to a stochastic framework in which bank
panics are caused, for instance, by extremely low returns on long-term projects would not
change the results substantially, but would only complicate the analysis.
Let us assume that a coordination failure triggers a bank run on one particular bank,
say, the bank 1 in region 1. In order to raise the liquidity needed to pay out the promised
short-term repayment d1 to all (patient and impatient) depositors the bank is forced to
sell o® its long-term ¯nancial claims.20 In equilibrium these ¯re sales reduce the asset
price dramatically, which might have an impact on bank 2 in the other region.
20Note that, as long as p1;2 > ², selling the assets at the ¯nancial market is preferable to liquidating the
¯rm.
234.1 Financial crises in market-oriented ¯nancial systems
In order to assume coordination failures as the trigger of a bank run in the further analysis,
we ¯rst have to show that a bank run is indeed an equilibrium in a market-oriented ¯nancial
system. At ¯rst glance, one might think that since banks do not provide any liquidity
insurance in market-oriented ¯nancial systems they would not be vulnerable to bank runs.
But this reasoning only holds if asset markets were perfectly liquid in the sense that any
amount of long-term assets could be sold at p1;2 = 1. However, as soon as the asset price
weakens only slightly, if the bank sells o® large stakes of its long-term claims, bank runs
can also occur in our market based ¯nancial system.
To see this, remember that the portfolio of bank 1 in the market-oriented ¯nancial
system is given by lMO
1 = q ¢i and kMO
1 = (1¡q)¢i. As soon as patient depositors expect
a fraction i¢qe to be withdrawn in t = 1, with qe > q, patient depositors will assume that
the bank sells long-term assets given by
ks
1 =
i ¢ (qe ¡ q)
pe
1;2
Thus, the repayment a patient depositor anticipates if he leaves his deposits with the










i ¢ (1 ¡ qe)
(22)
If this expected repayment is smaller that the promised short-term repayment of 1
(de
2 < 1), it is rational for a patient depositor to withdraw in t = 1.
Inserting the expected sales of long-term claims ks and the t = 0 investment in these
assets kMO
1 into (22) gives us the combinations of expected prices for long-term ¯nancial
assets (pe
1;2) and expected fractions of early withdrawers (qe) for which this argument holds
pe
1;2 <
(qe ¡ q) ¢ R
(1 ¡ q) ¢ R ¡ (1 ¡ qe)
(23)
As can easily be seen, if qe approaches 1, it is su±cient that the expected asset price
is smaller than 1. Thus, a bank run is a rational equilibrium in our framework if the asset
market is not perfectly liquid and asset prices fall in the event of ¯re sales. As we will see
below, this is always true in the present setting.
In describing the ¯nancial market equilibrium that will prevail in the event of a run
on a particular bank, we have to distinguish two cases.
First, assume that the equilibrium price will exceed ° ¢ R. In that case, after with-
drawing their deposits, because they expect a run on their bank, patient depositors of
bank 1 will hoard the liquidity. Buying long-term assets at pBR
1;2 > ° ¢ R that pay them
only ° ¢ R < 1 in t = 2 is less preferable than storing liquidity. Moreover, given that the
equilibrium price is larger than ° ¢ R, the incentive of patient depositors of bank 2 in the












Thus type B households of the second region leave their deposits with their bank and
do not show up at the ¯nancial market.
In addition to type A households which would also trade in a non-crisis situation, only
bank 1 sells o® ¯nancial assets during a crisis in this particular case. Since the bank will
sell all its long-term assets kMO






1 = (1 ¡ q) ¢ lMO
A (25)




equilibrium condition, the price for a long-term claim in the event of a bank run is
pBR
1;2 =
2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i)
2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) + i
(26)
Obviously, the equilibrium price in the event of a crisis is smaller than 1 as long as
there are any households of type B (i > 0). Thus a bank run is indeed an equilibrium.
The drop in asset prices due to a run on one bank is all the larger, the more depositors
hoard liquidity during a run. The di®erence between the price prevalent in normal times
(when no run occurs) and the one observable during a ¯nancial turmoil is all the larger,
the higher is the proportion of households of type B (i is comparatively high) and the
smaller the probability of being patient (q is large).
Remember the assumption that patient type B households from neither of the two
regions trade in the ¯nancial market in t = 1 when formulating the underlying equilibrium
condition. Thus, pBR
1;2 is only an equilibrium if additionally
° ¢ R <
2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i)
2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) + i
(27)
However, what happens if (27) does not hold? In that case, the equilibrium price will
always be exactly pBR
1;2 = °¢R. To see this, remember that, at this price, patient depositors
who withdrew their money from bank 1 are indi®erent between buying long-term assets
and storing liquidity for one period. Thus, in equilibrium any fraction ¹ of the patient
type B households from region 1 will be willing to use the repayment dBR
1 to buy long-term





1 = (1 ¡ q) ¢ lMO
A + ¹ ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ dBR
1 (28)
The amount bank 1 can repay on deposits (dBR
1 ) is given by the liquid reserves plus






25Inserting (29), (19), (20) and pBR
1;2 = ° ¢ R into (28) yields
¹ =
° ¢ R ¢ i ¡ 2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (1 ¡ °) ¢ R
° ¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i + q ¢ i
(30)
As is shown in appendix D for the given parameter setting, ¹ never exceeds 1 and
therefore pBR
1;2 = ° ¢ R is the lower bound for the asset price during crises in market-
oriented ¯nancial systems.
Since the incentive compatibility constraint (24) of patient depositors at bank 2 is not
violated at pBR
1;2 = ° ¢ R, a run on bank 1 in a market-oriented ¯nancial system and the
resulting drop in asset prices does not endanger the stability of any other bank. The
threshold level (pCT
1;2 ) below which patient type B households at bank 2 would withdraw







= f1;Rg into (24). Thus, contagion would occur in
market-oriented ¯nancial systems only if asset prices could fall below pCT
1;2 = ° .
Altogether, in market-oriented ¯nancial systems
1. bank runs are an equilibrium phenomenon
2. but ¯nancial markets are liquid enough to prevent contagion
3. the lower the fraction of type B households - the deeper ¯nancial markets are - and
the fewer households turn out to be patient, the smaller is the e®ect of a bank run
on ¯nancial market equilibrium.
4.2 Financial crises in bank-based ¯nancial systems
Turning to ¯nancial crises in bank-based ¯nancial systems, it is important to note, ¯rst,
that in this ¯nancial system a bank subject to a run could only raise additional liquidity
by selling ¯nancial assets to patient depositors of the other region. Remember that the
entire liquidity available in region 1 is already held by the bank; long-term ¯nancial claims
sold by the bank to patient type A households of region 1 can only be paid by the latter
with claims against the bank and not with t = 1 consumption goods. But, if bank 1 sells
assets to patient depositors of region 2, those households will pay with liquidity raised
by withdrawing deposits from bank 2. However, looking at the portfolio of bank 2 in the
symmetric equilibrium (13) shows that all the available liquidity lBD
2 = q¢dBD
1 is needed to
repay the impatient depositor. Given that bank 2 also planned to sell to their patient type
A households long-term assets at the ¯nancial market against their deposits, these claims
of patient type A households are not backed by liquid reserves. Therefore, whenever bank
1 o®ers ¯nancial assets at a discount in order to raise liquidity from depositors of region
2, bank 2 also runs out of liquidity and has to sell o® assets to meet its liquidity needs. In
equilibrium, bank 2 must try to meet the demand of its patient households at the given
price. If the bank is not able to do so, the patient type A households will demand liquidity
26in order to invest it at the ¯nancial market by buying assets supplied by the other bank.
But, since bank 2 has just su±cient liquidity to meet the payment obligations to impatient
depositors, any liquidity out°ow to patient type A households of this kind would mean
that the bank would be unable to meet the promised t = 1 repayment of dBD
1 and cause
an immediate collapse of the bank.
Therefore, with respect to the equilibrium asset price, two cases can emerge. Either
bank 2 can meet the demand for long-term assets of its patient type A depositors at the
equilibrium price or bank 2 also collapses. If bank 2 can cope with the drop in asset prices
due to the run on bank 1, all liquidity of bank 2 goes to its impatient depositors and is
immediately consumed. If the asset prices fall so severely that bank 2 cannot meet the
demand of its patient type A depositors, bank 2 will be subject to a run as well. In that
case, region 2 is just a re°ection of region 1, and bank 2 su®ers from the same lack of
liquidity. In any case, the equilibrium asset price can be calculated by the equilibrium
between the supply of assets by bank 1 and the demand by depositors of region 1.21
In general, the ¯re sales of bank 1 in the event of a run only cause a drop in asset
prices that may destabilize the other bank. However, these ¯re sales do not increase the
liquidity available to bank 1.
Before calculating the equilibrium after a run on one bank, we should check whether
a run is indeed an equilibrium phenomenon in this setting, too. Just like in the market-
oriented ¯nancial system, a run will occur if patient type B households expect that the
bank has to sell o® too much of its long-term assets, so that the long-term payment on
deposits falls below the short-term repayments. While the expression for the expected
long-run return on deposits can be expressed in this setting by (22), too, the expected
asset sales are now given by the sum of those sold to the patient type A households and
those sold to raise liquidity in order to meet withdrawals of patient type B households:
ks









Inserting (31) and (13) into (22) yields expression (32), which gives the combinations
of expected fractions of early withdrawals (qe) and expected prices at the ¯nancial market
(pe
1;2) that cause a run
pe
1;2 <
R ¢ i ¢ (qe ¡ q) + R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)
i ¢ [(1 ¡ q) ¢ £ ¡ (1 ¡ qe)] + R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)
(32)
Besides the fact that (32) shows the existence of a self-ful¯lling run equilibrium for
qe ! 1 even if pe
1;2 = 1, it is interesting to note that, in the bank-based ¯nancial system,
21In the case of both banks being subject to a run, supply and demand for assets should actually be
multiplied by 2. If bank 2 can withstand the drop in asset prices, it will successfully have neutralized the
asset demand of its patient type A depositors. Thus, dropping these two terms in the ¯rst place does not
change the result.
27the pure expectation of a drop in asset prices can cause a run. Even if a patient type B
household expects the other patient type B households not to withdraw early (qe = q)
but anticipates an asset price drop to
pe
1;2 <
R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)
i ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (£ ¡ 1) + R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)
(33)
it is preferable for it to withdraw in t = 1. Given these price expectations for many
patient type B households, a run will occur that might bring about the expected asset
price deterioration.
Now we arrive at the calculation of the equilibrium asset price in the event of a run. In
doing so we can again distinguish two cases. As long as pBR
1;2 > °¢R, it is never e±cient for
type B households to buy any long-term asset. They will instead prefer to hoard liquidity.
Therefore, in this case, even during a bank run only patient type A households demand
assets and the equilibrium condition is given by
kBD






As all depositors want to withdraw, the bank will sell o® all long-term assets. But now
since patient type B households also withdraw, available liquidity has to be split between
impatient depositors and patient type B depositors. The e®ective equilibrium short-term
repayment in the crisis situation dBR
1 is therefore given by
lBD
1 = q ¢ dBR
1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ dBR
1 (35)









(1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)







Obviously, in the event of a run, a bank cannot repay the promised amount. Inserting
the optimal exante holding of liquidity lBD
1 = q ¢ dBD







q + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i
(38)
will be repayed.
As can be seen from the expression for the equilibrium asset price during a banking




























1 = 1, (1¡q)¢(1¡i) < k
BD
1 , which always
holds given the exante optimal value of k
BD
1 and the fact that d
BD
1 > 1.
28Apparently, the extent of the drop caused by the banking crisis is determined by two
e®ects. On the one hand, the e®ect of ¯re sales on the equilibrium price is in°uenced
by the depth of the ¯nancial market. This e®ect is captured by the ¯rst term on the
right-hand side of (37). It is the relation of patient type A depositors to the rest of the
households. As this fraction increases, the relative depth of the market increases, in the
sense that more households in the economy are participating in the ¯nancial market and
are willing to buy long-term assets during a crisis. Thus the deviation of the asset price
from its normal level becomes smaller.
The second term captures the opposite e®ect. It is a measure of the liquidity of the
bank. Since all funds of the region are held by the bank, it also captures the liquidity of
the region. As the liquidity ratio in the bank's portfolio decreases as the fraction of type
A households increases, this e®ect enlarges the disruption of the asset price caused by ¯re
sales if 1 ¡ i becomes bigger.
Since there are two opposed e®ects of an increase in the fraction of type A households,
the comparative statics of pBR
1;2 with respect to i are not trivial. However, guessing that
the overall e®ect of an increase in i on the equilibrium asset price is negative tends to be
intuitive. As can be seen from expression (37) for the critical value i, the asset price in the
event of a banking crisis is positive. But, as the fraction of type A households vanishes
(i ! 1), the depth of the ¯nancial market approaches zero while the liquidity to capital




® .23 Thus, overall the asset price converges to 0.24
One of the assumptions made when formulating the equilibrium condition in a crisis
situation was that patient type B households do not have an incentive to buy long-term
assets. Instead, they were assumed to hoard liquidity since pBR
1;2 > ° ¢ R. But as stated in
the previous paragraph for i ! 1, pBR
1;2 ! 0. Therefore, for pBR
1;2 (i) > ° ¢ R there always
exists a threshold value ^ i > i for which
(1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡^ i)






= ° ¢ R
Analyzing the crisis equilibrium for economies with i ¸ ^ i, we start by assuming pBR
1;2 =
° ¢ R. Therefore, patient type B households are indi®erent as to whether to buy long-
term assets or store the withdrawn liquidity for one period. Given this assumption, the
equilibrium conditions for the ¯nancial market changes to
kBD





23Note, for i = 1 the optimal risk sharing £ = R
1
® can be realized. Replacing this in the optimal
deposit contract (10) and inserting the results into the optimal portfolio of the bank given by (13) yields
l
BD

























24A formal proof that p
BR
1;2 falls monotonically within the interval 1 ¸ i ¸ i is given in appendix E.
29where ¹ is again the fraction of indi®erent patient type B households that just ensures
the clearing of the ¯nancial market. Similarly, the equilibrium condition for the e®ective
repayment on deposits is now given by
lBD
1 = q ¢ dBR
1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ ¹) ¢ i ¢ dBR
1 (40)
Solving (39) and (40), one obtains the market clearing fraction of the indi®erent patient
type B households that have to buy long-term assets:
¹¤ = 1 ¡
lBD





1 + ° ¢ R ¢ kBD
1
¢
¢ (1 ¡ q)
(41)
Thus, whenever the fraction of type B households is larger than the threshold value ^ i,
the equilibrium arising during a banking crisis is characterized by an asset price pBR
1;2 = °¢R
and a fraction ¹¤ of patient type B households demanding long-term ¯nancial assets.25
Having calculated the equilibrium asset price in the event of a run on the bank in
region 1, we can turn to the most interesting question: Under which circumstances will
bank 2 be able to cope with this given asset price drop and under which parameter setting
will ¯nancial contagion through the asset market occur in that economy?
Remember, the long-term assets in the portfolio of bank 2 are given by
kBD




+ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 (42)
in which the ¯rst term was the amount of assets held to ¯nance the long-term payment on
deposits, while the second term was the planned supply of ¯nancial claims to its patient
type A depositors.
In order to calculate the threshold value of the asset price below which the second
bank will also collapse, we have to keep in mind the fact that the bank will need






long-term assets to meet the demand of its patient type A depositors to prevent them
from withdrawing liquidity in order to demand ¯nancial claims from bank 1.
Whenever the asset price falls below 1, the only way for the bank to meet the in-
creased demand of its patient type A depositors is by reducing the long-term repayment
25To show that, in fact, the equilibrium asset price can never fall below that critical level, it is su±cient
to prove that at least if all patient type B households demand assets there is no excess supply of assets
at p1;2 = ° ¢ R and markets are cleared at that price, or more formally, we have to show for p1;2 = ° ¢ R
that ¹
¤ · 1 always holds. Since the denominator in (41) is always positive, in order to demonstrate
that ¹
¤ · 1 it is su±cient to verify that l
BD
1 ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¡ ° ¢ R ¢ k
BD
1 ¢ q is also always non-negative. By
inserting the equilibrium level of the banks portfolio given by (13) this expression can be simpli¯ed to
° ¢ R ¢ [i ¢
£
R + (1 ¡ i)] · 1. This is obviously always true, since on the one hand by assumption ° ¢ R < 1
and since, on the other hand,
£
R < 1 and therefore i ¢
£
R + (1 ¡ i) < 1.
30on deposits. These repayments go to patient type B households. Given p1;2 ¸ ° ¢ R, the
best alternative to keeping their money with the bank is for these depositors to withdraw
and store the consumption goods for one period yielding no additional return. Therefore,
these repayments can at maximum be reduced to dBD
1 without inducing these depositors
to withdraw early and the minimal amount of assets needed to ¯nance these payouts is
given by (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢
dBD
1
R . Consequently, if the amount of assets that can be saved by
reducing the repayment to patient type B depositors is not enough to meet the increase





, bank 2 will also collapse.
Thus, the threshold level for the asset price below which contagion occurs (pCT
1;2 ) is de¯ned
by



















R ¢ (1 ¡ i)
R ¢ (1 ¡ i) + i ¢ (£ ¡ 1)
(45)
As shown in appendix F for i · ^ i, this threshold level is always above the equilibrium
asset price during a banking crisis. The drop in asset prices caused by ¯re sales of a
bank subject to a run will be so large that the other bank will not be able to meet the
asset demand of its patient type A households. Patient type A households will therefore
withdraw liquidity to demand assets from the other bank. But since bank 2 needs all
liquidity to repay impatient households, this withdrawal of liquidity by patient type A
households will precipitate bank 2 into a collapse as well.
However, it is easy to see from expression (45) that if the fraction of type A households
becomes smaller than (1¡^ i) and converges to 0, the asset price the bank is able to hold out,
approaches 0. Therefore, there exists a level i¤ > ^ i at which pCT
1;2 falls below pBR = ° ¢ R.
For i > i¤, the asset price deterioration due to a run on a single bank is not so large that
the price actually falls below the respective pCT
1;2 and destabilizes the other bank.
Thus, while in rather moderately bank-dominated ¯nancial systems (i < i < i¤) the
asset price drop due to a run on one bank cannot be bu®ered by the second bank and
¯nancial contagion occurs, in more strictly bank-dominated ¯nancial systems, in which
only a small fraction of households has an equally e±cient access to investment oppor-
tunities like banks (i > i¤), the asset price deterioration caused by a bank run does not
destabilize other institutions.
Altogether, in bank-based ¯nancial systems
1. just like in a market-oriented ¯nancial system, the lower the fraction of type B
households is, or, the deeper ¯nancial markets are, the smaller is the e®ect of a bank
run on the asset price
312. the drop in asset prices due to the ¯re sales of an illiquid institute can cause contagion
of another bank if the ¯nancial system is only moderately bank-dominated, i.e. if
there is still a rather large fraction of type A households (i < i < i¤).
3. banks may be able to bu®er even extremely large drops in asset prices if a fairly
large fraction of households (i > i¤) cannot invest as e±ciently as the bank at the
¯nancial market.
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1;2 at a given level of i, a bank run on an individual bank
causes asset price drops which induce a collapse of the other bank. As can be seen from the
graph, this happens neither in market-oriented nor in strictly bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems.
In market-dominated ¯nancial systems (i < i), asset price deteriorations after the run
on one bank are rather moderate (pBR
1 ) because ¯nancial markets are comparatively deep.
Moreover, since banks do not trade in the secondary ¯nancial market, the threshold level
for asset prices below which contagion would occur is considerably lower. The asset price
drop would destabilize other banks only if those patient households without e±cient access
to direct investments suddenly preferred to hold ¯nancial claims directly because of their
low price (pCT
1 = °).26
26Note the saltus of p
BR
1 at the transition from a market-based ¯nancial system to a bank-based ¯nancial
system (i = i). This results from the fact that the amount of ¯nancial claims held by banks and sold o®
in a crisis jumps upward at the change from a market-based ¯nancial system to a bank-based ¯nancial
system. Formally, this can be shown by inserting k
BR
1 (i) = (1 ¡ q) and l
BR












q¢(1¡i)+i, which is obviously always true.
32In contrast, ¯nancial markets in strictly bank-dominated ¯nancial systems (i > i¤)
tend to be illiquid and ¯re sales cause severe asset price deteriorations (pBR
1 = °R). But,
since the trading volume of banks in the secondary ¯nancial market is quite small in
relation to their total assets, they are able to bu®er trading losses by reducing long-run
repayments without inducing long-run depositors to withdraw (pCT
1 ).
It is only in rather hybrid or weakly bank-dominated ¯nancial systems (i > i > i¤)
that the trading volume of banks in the secondary ¯nancial market - i.e. the expected
liquidity in°ow from trading - is so large (relative to their balance sheet total) that a
drop of asset prices due to ¯re sales of one bank will cause the collapse of other banks.
Thus, only those ¯nancial systems are so fragile that the breakdown of a single bank has
a contagious e®ect on the other ¯nancial institution.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The ¯rst part of the paper derived endogenously two very distinct ¯nancial systems cov-
ering some basic features of the two contrasting ¯nancial systems of Germany, on the one
hand, and UK and the US, on the other.
For a relatively high fraction of households with investment opportunities which are
as e±cient as those available to banks, the model depicts some elementary characteris-
tics of the US and UK-type ¯nancial system. For instance, in this setting, banks do not
provide any additional liquidity insurance compared to the market. They simply provide
households lacking access to e±cient direct investment opportunities with e±cient indi-
rect alternatives. Thus, banks' main function is to economize on transaction costs for
its depositors. Compared with the bank-based ¯nancial system, the trading volume of
households at the ¯nancial markets is large, although banks do not play a major (in the
extreme case, any) role in the secondary ¯nancial market. A large fraction of households
holds claims against the corporate sector directly. Households are actively trading in the
primary as well as in the secondary ¯nancial market.
Quite the opposite holds if the fraction of households with access to e±cient direct
investment opportunities is comparatively small. In that case, the emerging ¯nancial
system displays basic characteristics of the German bank-dominated ¯nancial system.
The role of banks is not restricted to enabling all households to bene¯t from e±cient
investment opportunities; they provide liquidity insurance as well. Banks trade actively
in the secondary ¯nancial market and are the dominant (or only) player in the primary
market. Households are not engaged in the primary market and only some participate in
the secondary ¯nancial market.
The second part of the paper analyzed the e®ect of a bank run on the economy. In
doing so, the model proved for the di®erent types of ¯nancial systems the assessment of
Allen and Gale (2000a), p. 13:
33Troubled intermediaries, seeking to ¯nd liquidity by selling their assets on the
market, simply reduce the value of their assets, thereby making their problems
worse. The mere existence of a market does not provide liquidity to the system
as a whole, nor does it ensure that liquidity will be available to the banking
sector on reasonable terms.
With respect to the implications for 'lender of last resort' policies, it is interesting
to note that it is only in market-oriented ¯nancial systems that a stabilization of asset
prices at the pre-crisis (or normal) level can prevent ine±cient bank runs. In bank-based
¯nancial systems, by contrast, a lender of last resort that provides emergency liquidity
assistance at the normal price p1;2 = 1 cannot avert self-ful¯lling banking collapses. Thus,
in these ¯nancial systems there is an additional role for a deposit insurance.
But, most interestingly, the paper shows that, in some economies, ¯re sales of troubled
banks not only worsen their own problems but also trigger crises at other banks if the
lender of last resort does not stabilize asset prices. Banks in market-oriented systems
face a ¯nancial market that is always deep enough to bu®er the e®ect of ¯re sales, with
the result that contagion of other institutions is prevented. Moreover, since banks in
market-oriented ¯nancial systems do not trade in the secondary ¯nancial market, they are
less dependent on asset price developments. Banks in strictly bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems face very severe asset price deteriorations during a crisis. However, they are able
to compensate for these large drops, since the ratio of banks' trading volume to their
total assets tend to be low. But banks in hybrid or weakly bank-dominated ¯nancial
systems face rather large asset price drops due to ¯re sales of other institutions and have
a comparatively high trading volume. Thus, they cannot bu®er the shortfall in liquidity
in°ow during a crisis by a reduction of long-term deposit repayments.
Hence, the paper points out that
² economies without one of the polar ¯nancial systems are more fragile; in other words,
hybrid ¯nancial systems bear the risk of ¯nancial contagion
² a gradual transformation of a bank-based ¯nancial system towards a market-oriented
¯nancial system may be accompanied by a transitory increase in ¯nancial fragility
and in risks of ¯nancial contagion.
Thus, in a hybrid ¯nancial system as well as in an economy with a ¯nancial system
under transition, there is a need for a lender of last resort to provide liquidity to the
¯nancial market during crisis periods, thereby stabilizing asset prices.
One possible criticism of the model presented here could be that there is no reason for
a ¯nancial market to exist. The introduction of a ¯nancial market not only restraints the
utility-enhancing liquidity transformation of banks, it also entails the risk of ¯nancial con-
tagion. However this is obviously a drawback that results from necessary simpli¯cations.
34Introducing perfectly negatively correlated region-speci¯c °uctuations of the fraction of
impatient households, for instance, would generate an e±ciency-enhancing e®ect of ¯nan-
cial markets27 without changing the basic features of the presented model.
Another caveat is certainly that banks have no reason to hold excess liquidity in the
model, since there is no aggregate risk against which they could insure by keeping more
liquidity than needed for the expected repayment to short-term depositors. If the model
incorporated, for instance, aggregate risk concerning the fraction of impatient households,
banks would have an incentive to hold additional liquidity in order to prevent a collapse in
situations with a rather high proportion of impatient households. However, if this fraction
is coincidentally low, banks can use these additional liquide reserves to buy assets from a
bank that is hit by a run, limiting the price e®ect of ¯re sales and thereby reducing the
scope of contagion. But even if this e®ect were large enough to prevent severe asset price
deteriorations and ¯nancial contagion in cases with a low aggregate fraction of impatient
households, the results of the paper would still hold in instances with a rather high fraction
of impatient depositors.
27One recent paper in which the emergence of interbank markets is explained in this way is Allen and
Gale (2001b).
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s.t. q ¢ dT
1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢
dT
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The repayment scheme of the deposit contract will only deviate from that optimal risk
sharing ratio if it violates the incentive compatibility constraint. This is the case if the
incentive compatibility constraint is steeper than the optimal risk sharing ratio. In that
case, the ratio of the optimal constraint deposit contract will be given by the incen-






increases along the budget constraint.
36B Pooling contract for maximizing expected utility of type
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s.t. [q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)] ¢ d1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ d2
R · 1 (BC)
maxf1; R
p1;2g ¢ d1 ¸ d2 (ICA)
maxf1;
°R
p1;2g ¢ d1 · d2 (ICB)
FOC:









= [q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)] ¢ ¸
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u0 (d2) =
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(1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u0 (d2)
=
q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i
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= q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i) ¢ R ¢ u0 (d2)
By inserting the speci¯c assumed utility function, this can be simpli¯ed to
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. This is always true
because
q ¢ (i ¡ 1)
| {z }
<0








37C Solution to Problem 3
(P3)
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
max
d1;d2
q ¢ i ¢ u(d1) + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u(d2)
s.t. [q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)] ¢ d1 + (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ d2
R · 1 (BC)
maxf1; R
p1;2g ¢ d1 ¸ d2 (ICA)
maxf1;
°R
p1;2g ¢ d1 · d2 (ICB)
Taking only BC into account yields the ¯rst order conditions
q ¢ i ¢ u0(d1) = ¸ ¢ [q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)] (48)
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u0(d2) = ¸ ¢
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i
R
(49)
From (48) divided by (49) follows
q ¢ i ¢ u0(d1)
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ u0(d2)
=
q ¢ i + (1 ¡ i)
(1 ¡ q) ¢ i
¢ R
q ¢ u0(d1)







Inserting the assumed utility function
(d1)¡®
(d2)¡® =













(50) into (BC) yields





R ¡ (R ¡ £) ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i
= dBD
1 (51)
Reinserting (51) into (50)
£
R ¡ (R ¡ £) ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i
= dBD
2 (52)
38D Proof that pBR
1;2 has a lower bound at ° ¢ R in market-
oriented ¯nancial systems
The fraction of patient type A households that has to buy long-term claims in order to
ensure the ¯nancial market equilibrium is given by (30). If ¹ · 1 holds for all parameter
settings, the equilibrium price pBR
1;2 will never fall below ° ¢ R. This always holds because
1 ¸
° ¢ R ¢ i ¡ 2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (1 ¡ ° ¢ R)
° ¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i + q ¢ i
° ¢ R ¢ (1 ¡ q) ¢ i + q ¢ i ¸ ° ¢ R ¢ i ¡ 2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (1 ¡ ° ¢ R)
¡° ¢ R ¢ q ¢ i + q ¢ i ¸ ¡2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (1 ¡ ° ¢ R)
(1 ¡ ° ¢ R) ¢ q ¢ i
| {z }
¸0
¸ ¡2 ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (1 ¡ ° ¢ R)
| {z }
·0
39E Proof that pBR
1;2 is monotonically falling for i > i
pBR
1;2 (i) =
(1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)



























(1 ¡ i) ¢ (q + i ¢ (1 ¡ q))
Taking account of kBD
1 = (1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢
dBD
2
R + (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ dBD
1 , lBD
1 = q ¢ dBD
1 and
dBD









R ¡ £ ¡ i ¢ £0(i)
R ¡ i ¢ R + i ¢ £
Thus pBR
1;2 is monotonically falling if
1
(1 ¡ i) ¢ (q + i ¢ (1 ¡ q))
>
R ¡ £ ¡ i ¢ £0(i)
R ¡ i ¢ R + i ¢ £
, (1 ¡ i) ¢ R + i ¢ £ > [R ¡ £ ¡ i ¢ £0(i)] ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ (q + i ¢ (1 ¡ q))
, (1¡i)¢R+i¢£¡[R¡£¡i¢£0(i)]¢(1¡i) > [R¡£¡i¢£0(i)]¢(1¡i)¢(q¡1+i¢(1¡q))
, £ + £0(i) ¢ i ¢ (1 ¡ i)
| {z }
Y
> ¡[R ¡ £ ¡ i ¢ £0(i)]
| {z }
Z
¢ (1 ¡ i)2 ¢ (1 ¡ q)
This is always true if Z > 0 and Y > 0. From
£ =
µ








® ¢ q ¢ i2 ¢
µ






Therefore, since R ¡ £ > 0, also Z > 0.




i ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ R
® ¢ q ¢ i2 ¢
µ








i ¢ (1 ¡ i) ¢ R ¢ q ¢ i





(® ¡ 1) ¢ (1 ¡ i) + ® ¢ q ¢ i





Since W > 0 also Y > 0 which ¯nally proves that pBR
1 is monotonically falling in i.
41F Proof that pBR
1;2 > pCT
1;2 for i > i












1;2 can be rearranged yielding
R ¢ (1 ¡ i)
R ¢ (1 ¡ i) + i ¢ (£ ¡ 1)
>
(1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)




(1 ¡ q) ¢ i ¢ £
R ¢ dBD




R ¢ (1 ¡ i) + i ¢ (£ ¡ 1)
>
q
[1 ¡ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)][i ¢ £ + (1 ¡ i) ¢ R]
,
1










1 ¡ (1 ¡ q) ¢ (1 ¡ i)
| {z }
C
Note that A > B since £ ¡ 1 < £ and C < 1 since
q
q+i¢(1¡q) < 1.
Therefore, A > B ¢ C always holds.
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